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Dangers of the digital fit: Rethinking
seamlessness and social sustainability in
data-intensive healthcare
Sarah Wadmann1 and Klaus Hoeyer2
Abstract
For years, attempts at ensuring the social sustainability of digital solutions have focused on ensuring that they are
perceived as helpful and easy to use. A smooth and seamless work experience has been the goal to strive for. Based
on document analysis and interviews with 15 stakeholders, we trace the setting up of a data infrastructure in Danish
General Practice that had achieved just this goal – only to end in a scandal and subsequent loss of public support. The
ease of data access made it possible for data to be extracted, exchanged and used by new actors and for new purposes –
without those producing the data fully realizing the expansion of the infrastructure. We suggest that the case has wider
relevance for a still more data-intensive healthcare sector and a growing data economy: when those who produce the
data are not made aware of new uses of data, it makes it more difficult to resolve potential conflicts along the way. In the
Danish case, conflicting views on legitimate data use led to the collapse of the infrastructure. Therefore, while seam-
lessness may be a solution to the old problem of a poor fit between user and technology, this celebrated virtue may also
involve new problems relating to social instability. As digital solutions tend to be integrated still more seamlessly in still
more of our activities, we need to develop political mechanisms to define and protect the rights and obligations of both
data suppliers and users in order to ensure the long-term sustainability of digital infrastructures.
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Introduction
Do you have diﬃculties getting an erection? Are you
worried about your looks? Or do you have problems
with friends or ﬁnances? General practitioners [GPs]
have reported such information to a national database
for years without obtaining patients’ consent. (Tynell
and Fischer, 2014)1
In the late summer of 2014, Danish news media were
full of reports like this. A public controversy developed
around data extraction from medical records, akin to
but ﬁercer than similar contestations in other countries,
such as Australia, England and the Netherlands
(Garrety et al., 2014; Smits, 2013; Sterckx et al., 2016;
Vezyridis and Timmons, 2017). At the centre of the
Danish controversy was a particular technology for
the extraction, storage and exchange of health data,
viz. Dansk Almen Medicinsk Database, DAMD (the
Danish General Practitioners Database). The contro-
versy took the developers by surprise. DAMD was cele-
brated as one of the most important achievements in
the history of quality improvement in Danish general
practice; a ‘visionary’ and ‘impressive development’
(Boysen, 2011). However, following the intense media
debate and the ensuing parliamentary discussion, the
database was oﬃcially abolished in 2014 and data
ﬂows were suspended (Langhoﬀ et al., 2016).
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DAMD was damned, as it were. This article revisits the
DAMD case to explore what lessons it may hold for the
social sustainability of digital infrastructures, also
beyond general practice and the Danish borders.
In building a nationwide infrastructure enabling
automatic data extraction from medical records with
fast and tailored feedback on performance to GPs
(Schroll et al., 2012), the developers of DAMD had
mastered what had long been seen as a major challenge
in digital development, namely to create a good ﬁt
between user and technology to allow for eﬃcient and
seamless work experiences (Ishii and Ulmer, 1997;
Uschold and Gruninger, 2004; Yankelovich et al.,
1988). With seamless, we not only mean that the tech-
nology was well-functioning, but also that it was
embedded in a wider infrastructure that enabled the
collection and exchange of a wealth of health data,
without requiring much eﬀort on the part of those pro-
viding the data. The ideal of a ‘digital ﬁt’ has long
guided digital developments (Hyysalo et al., 2016). It
has even been worked into regulatory standards, such
as the ISO Standard 9241-210:2010 outlining user
experience as a precondition for the economic and
social sustainability of digital solutions (International
Organization for Standardization, 2015). However, the
solution to the problems of yesterday often carries the
germ to the problems of tomorrow. The achievement of
the much desired ‘digital ﬁt’, led to the emergence of
new problems that eventually caused the shutdown of
DAMD. It has previously been noted that incremental
additions of new uses of data that are unrelated to clin-
ical care may threaten the sustainability of digital infra-
structures (Winthereik et al., 2007). Such a gradual
layering of data uses has also been stated as a cause
of the collapse in the case of DAMD: Langhoﬀ et al.
(2016) argue that the gradual inclusion of new data
users with agendas clashing with existing ones led the
data extraction to become politically contested and
eventually break down. We take this argument a step
further and suggest that the mode of expansion mat-
tered and that it might in fact contain one of the key
lessons having value beyond the speciﬁc case. We argue
that the seamlessness strived for in the ‘digital ﬁt’
undermined the social sustainability because it not
merely enabled the expansion of data use, but did so
without establishing the political checks and balances
through which the legitimacy of new uses could be
negotiated.
This point, we believe, is of wider relevance for the
emerging global infrastructures of the data economy,
even beyond healthcare. High-tech companies such as
Google, FaceBook, Baidu and Alibaba deal in data,
and their data markets thrive on seamless technology
experiences (Creemers, 2016). On the one hand, these
companies require enormous amounts of data to enable
the experience of seamlessness, because it is generated
through tools of machine learning that are dependent
of massive amounts of data. On the other hand, the
companies depend on seamless data extraction to
obtain these large amounts of data in the ﬁrst place.
In a self-fuelling process, seamlessness is both the end
and the means of large parts of the current digitalized
data markets. However, the seamless data generation
typically comes with a lack of clarity regarding data use
(Pasquale, 2015). As digital solutions become seam-
lessly integrated in still more of our activities, we there-
fore advocate a need for developing political
mechanisms to deﬁne and protect the rights and obli-
gations of both data suppliers and users, in order to
ensure the sustainability of the emerging digital infra-
structures and data markets.
Infrastructuring, seamlessness and
social sustainability
Bowker and Star (2000 [1999]) famously pointed out
how infrastructures are often mistakenly considered
technical, neutral constructs upon which other entities
and activities run. Science and Technology Studies
(STS) scholars argue instead that infrastructures
should be understood not as a material conglomer-
ation, but as forms of practice co-produced by human
and non-human actors; hence, the notion of infrastruc-
turing (Bowker et al., 2010). In the words of Star and
Ruhleder (1996: 112), ‘infrastructure is something that
emerges for people in practice, connected to activities
and structure’. Infrastructures are built, rebuilt and
function in certain ways, depending on which actors
are involved in which ways, and how they are related
(Danholt and Langstrup, 2012). Analytically, infra-
structure therefore ‘appears only as a relational prop-
erty, not as a thing stripped of use’ (Star and Ruhleder,
1996: 113). Whereas the design of information infra-
structures tends to focus on the technical integration
of system components (Ellingsen and Monteiro,
2003), it is equally important to recognize the context-
ual nature of medical information and the work it
requires to make the information meaningful outside
a particular context (Berg and Goorman, 1999).
When referring to this dynamic process of creating,
extracting, curating and storing data while simultan-
eously making them available for multiple purposes,
we use the notion of intensiﬁed data sourcing (Hoeyer,
2016: 74). Today, automation has delegated much of
this work to non-human actors operating on the basis
of algorithms and other scripts (Stacey and Suchman,
2012). This may allow for seamless work experiences
because the extraction, processing and storing of data
require no immediate eﬀort by the user. However, it
also creates challenges of opacity, as it becomes
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increasingly diﬃcult for users to grasp how the data
sourcing occurs unless speciﬁc eﬀort is made to create
transparency (Wyatt et al., 2016).
Discussions on visibility and invisibility in relation
to infrastructure have a long history in STS. Star (1999)
noted that ‘the normally invisible quality of working
infrastructure becomes visible when it breaks’ suggest-
ing that infrastructures are rarely noticed until they
break down. Bowker et al. (2010) made a call for STS
to do the work of what he called an ‘infrastructural
inversion’: making visible the backstage and often
under-valued work of infrastructuring and tracing the
politics buried in technical encodings. Contrasting this
approach, others have paid attention to the ways in
which infrastructures are made visible as political sym-
bols. Larkin (2013) emphasises what he calls ‘the grand
spectacles’ of infrastructures: they often serve as highly
visible symbols in political projects, even when they do
little infrastructural work. The breakdown of DAMD
made this infrastructure visible, while bringing an end
to the infrastructural work – and we seek to understand
how the seamless mode of data sourcing inﬂuenced the
ability of the involved actors to ‘see’ the digital infra-
structure they were part of and how the infrastructure
was made visible by the actors as part of political
projects.
The sustainability of digital infrastructures is not just
a matter of technical integration; they embark on both
technical and social resources to evolve and endure
(Bowker et al., 2010). Often, the failure of digital sys-
tems to become infrastructures is depicted as unsuccess-
ful attempts to link with other systems and adapt to
changes in the environment (Edwards et al., 2009;
Ellingsen and Monteiro, 2003). In the present case,
the integration arguably became too successful
(Langhoﬀ et al., 2016) – but only because the expansion
happened in a way that did not allow for political
renegotiation of the interests at stake. It is this empha-
sis on conﬂicting views on legitimate data sourcing we
mean to signify when referring to the social sustainabil-
ity of infrastructures.
Where and how: Exploring the DAMD
infrastructure
To understand the historical rise and fall of DAMD, we
tracked publicly available documents, and arranged
them into a timeline. The documents include articles in
national newspapers and professional journals (e.g.,
Dagens Medicin), an investigation of the case underta-
ken by a national healthcare authority (Statens Serum
Institut, 2014), news updates, annual reports and a
response to the before-mentioned investigation pub-
lished by the Danish general practice quality unit
(retrieved from: www.dak-e.dk). Because various
institutions and persons have diﬀering interests in the
presentation of the case, we made sure to include
accounts that represented various viewpoints. Based
on this overview, we identiﬁed actors who either
worked with or sought to inﬂuence decisions regarding
data sourcing in general practice.2 We contacted them
for semi-structured interviews to explore their percep-
tion of the DAMD case and how data mattered to
them. Some of these actors played a central role in the
development of the case, as they were involved in the
development of the database, the administration of it
or the political debate that ensued around it. Hence,
the topic is sensitive to them. To protect the identity of
the informants who requested this, we have had to with-
hold information on the exact position from which they
spoke. Interviews were conducted with 15 informants.
The interviews lasted between 65 and 180 minutes and
were recorded, transcribed and coded based on open
empirical questions including: How are purposes of
data sourcing expressed, by whom and when? When
does the infrastructure become visible for whom and in
which ways? When do controversies arise, and what are
they about? From the interviews it became clear that the
notion of visibility of the infrastructure alsomattered for
how the case evolved. Hence, the visibility of the infra-
structure became an empirical phenomenon worth
exploring in its own right. We explored when it
became visible and for whom, how the seamlessness of
the infrastructure mattered in this respect, and in which
ways the infrastructure was made visible. Before we
move to the analysis of these processes, some informa-
tion about the Danish context is necessary.
Denmark: A data-intensive country
Denmark is a small and relatively wealthy welfare state
in Northern Europe with 5.7 million inhabitants. While
the Ministry of Health is ultimately responsible for the
national healthcare system, ﬁve regional authorities are
politically and administratively responsible for organiz-
ing the delivery of healthcare, including GP services.
Healthcare services are paid mainly through taxes and
are free at the point of delivery for all citizens. GPs are
self-employed but receive most of their income from the
regional healthcare authority with which they contract.
These contracts are based on collective agreements.
Citizens register with a GP, who will then refer them
to the specialized healthcare services if necessary.
There is an option of side-stepping the referral and
increasing one’s free choice of provider in return for a
co-payment, but only 1% of the population make use
of this coverage option (Olejaz et al., 2012). In this way,
GPs act as gatekeepers to the healthcare services as well
as custodians of a longitudinal health record (cf.
Vezyridis and Timmons, 2016).
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In Denmark, the infrastructure of health data
exchange goes to the core of the organization of the
welfare services, and its contestation potentially aﬀects
everything that professionals and citizens do. Compared
to many other countries, the Nordic countries are not
only developed welfare states; they are also highly data
intensive. We prefer the notion of data-intensive health-
care to the more fashionable notion of Big Data because
it captures better the basic observation that multiple
actors aim for more data, of a better quality and on
more people without necessarily agreeing on what the
data should be used for (Hoeyer, 2016). Since the 1980s,
Denmark has also aimed for the position of being a
digital frontrunner, and the country is repeatedly rated
as one of the most digitalized countries in the world
(Frost & Sullivan, 2017). In the area of healthcare, con-
siderable state resources have been invested during the
past four decades in the digitalization of medical records
and in the enabling of data exchange across healthcare
providers and diﬀerent IT systems, e.g., through the
production of standards. The tradition of centralized
data registration of citizens, however, dates back to
the beginning of the 20th-century. Residence registries
have existed since 1924, before that the police kept resi-
dence records, and with the introduction of a centralized
person register (CPR) in 1968 each citizen was assigned
a personal identiﬁcation number at birth or immigration
(Willumsen, 1999). The CPR number is used in all inter-
actions with the public services, including not only
health services, but also social services, education, mili-
tary service, income and taxation. All this data accumu-
lation takes place without informed consent. Most
private services use the traceability of the CPR system
too, for example telecommunication, transport, bank-
ing and even gyms and grocery shopping bonus pro-
grammes use this number.
Taken together, these opportunities for tracking of
individuals throughout life have given Denmark the
reputation as ‘the epidemiologist’s dream’ (Frank,
2003). While such state-controlled data assemblage
would be controversial in many other contexts, it is
rarely questioned in Denmark. The seamless data
exchanges make a number of everyday operations run
very smoothly, and though some studies refer to a
‘crisis of trust’, surveys of citizen attitudes continue to
report relatively high levels of trust in state institutions
(Mandag Morgen, 2016). However, as the DAMD case
rose to the national political agenda, it made visible the
seamless data infrastructure in ways that made some
health professionals and citizens publicly express dis-
trust in the public administration of health data.
We seek to develop these points, as we now turn to
the analysis. The analysis is divided into three parts.
First, we describe the vision that the developers of
DAMD pursued. Next, we demonstrate how the
purposes of data sourcing gradually accumulated over
time, as more actors were included in the infrastructure.
We use the term purposes to signal an ambition of data
use; it does not necessarily imply actual use. As we will
demonstrate in the analysis, the articulations of ambi-
tions can have profound eﬀects, even when the actual
state of implementation is diﬃcult to pinpoint. Last, we
show how the eﬀorts of the developers to enable seam-
less data ﬂows also made it possible to overlook diver-
gent views on legitimate data use, until they surfaced as
outright conﬂict.
A vision of data-driven quality
improvement
DAMD was developed around 2005 by a small group
of pioneering Danish GPs, who had led the way in
digitalizing medical records and worked hard to intro-
duce what they called ‘data-driven quality develop-
ment’ in general practice. For the developers, the
tools they were developing constituted part of making
general practice a modern and future-oriented place of
chronic care. One of the developers, whom we will
name Erik,3 was a GP himself. Recognizing what he
saw as important virtues in general practice, he envi-
sioned that GPs could lead the way in chronic care.
‘Our virtue is that we know the patients. [. . .] We also
know the social conditions and so on’, he explained and
continued: ‘so general practice is really well suited for
chronic care’. What were missing, according to Erik,
were feedback mechanisms that would oﬀer GPs a
better overview of their patient populations and some
means to evaluate their own work in a structured way.
He explained: ‘As a GP [. . .] you’d actually like to know
how you’re doing’. But because the GPs lacked the
tools to identify relevant patient populations, Erik
noted, it was diﬃcult to know how well the patients
were being treated:
In general practice, it’s patient contact full time. [. . .]
[GPs] have individual contacts, but not really an over-
view of the population. [. . .] You may have 20 really
well-treated diabetics. But if you haven’t found the
other 50, it might not look so good after all.
In the experience of Erik and his collaborators, shifting
the perspective from the individual patient to the popu-
lation made them realize that the most vulnerable
patients in the greatest need of care were also those
who did not show up for check-ups. Hence, to enable
GPs to care better also for those patients who fail to
appear they started to set up what they came to see as a
system for ‘data-driven quality improvement’. DAMD
was the result of this work, but more eﬀort was
required before it was in place.
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Standardizing, centralizing and automating to
enable seamless data flows
A ﬁrst eﬀort included the standardization of informa-
tion registration through the development of a Danish
version of the International Classiﬁcation of Primary
Health Care (ICPC). This was published in 1992. By
coding patient contacts in a uniform manner, Erik
explained, he and a handful of colleagues were able to
start ‘retrieving data from the electronic medical
record’ and combine them with other data sources,
e.g., from laboratories. The purpose was to improve
the quality of care, and the means was a standardiza-
tion that would allow comparisons between patients
and patient populations. However, for the technology
to ﬁt into the busy work life of GPs, it needed to be
easier to use. According to Erik, a pilot run in the late
1990s showed that GPs had to spend a whole day every
third month to generate even very simple statistics for
just one patient group. Erik remembered thinking: ‘it
must be possible to do this in a more rational way’. He
continued: ‘it made me realize that these data needed to
be gathered automatically’. Thus, the developers strived
to automate the mode of data sourcing. This agenda of
automation has become a key feature of the grander
data economy, creating a series of invisibilities
(O’Neil, 2016). In the Danish case, the ambition was
not to create invisibility per se, but to generate data
‘without disturbing the physician’ (Schroll, 2013: 3).
The rationalization eﬀorts included new actors in the
infrastructure. Following a collective agreement
between the general practitioners organization (PLO)
and the regional authorities, a GP Quality Unit called
Dansk Almenmedicinsk Kvalitetsenhed, DAK-E, was
established during 2003–2006. Headed by some of the
developers of DAMD, DAK-E was given a prominent
role in the data infrastructure. With responsibility for
the daily operation of DAMD, DAK-E undertook the
data cleaning, developed the algorithms that allowed
for the combination and presentation of data and deliv-
ered ‘readymade quality reports’ to the GPs, as Erik
phrased it. In this way, the ‘articulation work’ neces-
sary to keep the standardized processes on track was
moved from individual GPs to the quality unit (cf.
Strauss et al., 1997 [1985]). The eﬀort to automate the
data sourcing also brought a new material actor into
the infrastructure: the software Sentinel Datafangst.
Sentinel means lighthouse: it ‘brings light and shows
the way forward in quality development’, DAK-E
explained (DAK-E, 2013). The Danish notion of
Datafangst can be translated into Data Catch. So it
was called because the software made it possible to
‘catch’ data from the medical records, a developer
explained. The ‘catch’, or the extraction we might say,
entailed that the structured information in the
electronic medical records was automatically copied
on a daily basis and the copy stored in DAMD.
Hence, GPs could use the tool without bothering
about the concrete data management and analysis. In
sum, through eﬀorts to standardize, centralize and
automate the sourcing of data, the developers strived
to achieve a seamless and eﬃcient work experience, in
order for the technology to ﬁt into the busy work life of
the GPs.
A helpful tool
The result of all these eﬀorts was a system that made
use of data recorded as part of routine care and, for the
ﬁrst time ever, provided GPs with the option of easily
having their patients shown as a population stratiﬁed
according to registered diagnoses. Clinical indicators
were provided for GPs to be able to check the treatment
status of individual patients with certain registered
diagnoses. These indicators also allowed for bench-
marking against national averages, enabling GPs to
identify their own weak spots. For patients with dia-
betes, clinical indicators would for example include
blood sugar levels, blood pressure and prescribed medi-
cations. Moreover, visual cues were oﬀered to make it
easier for GPs to detect patients who might require
clinical attention. For example, colour markings
would draw attention to potential risks (e.g., increased
excretion of protein through the kidneys, indicating
kidney impairment) or provide swift identiﬁcation of
patients who had not attended an annual check-up
within a given time frame. In addition, cross-tabula-
tions made by DAK-E on the request of GPs allowed
for easy identiﬁcation of patients who were eligible for
certain services (e.g., free inﬂuenza vaccination) or were
treated with certain medications (e.g., medicines soon
to lose subsidization). ‘In this way, you could run the
clinic more eﬃciently and provide better treatment for
the patients’, Erik stated. Not only the developers liked
the system. It was also seen as helpful by GP-users, as it
allowed them to keep better track of patients and pro-
vided information of relevance to treatment decisions
(Lippert, 2014). Even people who later became ﬁerce
opponents of the system look back upon it as being
helpful. In the words of one of the GPs who led the
opposition against DAMD, it provided ‘a fantastic
overview’ for GPs when treating patients with chronic
diseases. A leader from a regional government even
referred to the system as ‘about the best thing that
has happened in the Danish healthcare services for
years’.
At this point in the development, GPs envisaged
data circulating in a closed loop. Developers and regio-
nal authorities agreed with this view and saw GPs as
both the data producers and users. The purpose was
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quality development understood as eﬀorts to assist
individual GPs (and patients) in making decisions
about treatment practices. However, once the standards
and means for easy data exchange were in place, stake-
holders saw new opportunities. The purposes of data
use that they added transformed the infrastructure; in
the words of Langhoﬀ et al. (2016), it fundamentally
altered the ontology. The incremental addition of pur-
poses of data use was seamless from the point of view
of the GPs, in the sense that it did not require any extra
work of them (cf. Berg and Goorman, 1999). They
could continue their routines, while data began travel-
ling further and acquire new functions.
The seamless accumulation of purposes
From overviews serving the individual GP, data from
DAMD also came to be used for decision-support in
the encounter with patients. As collaborations devel-
oped between DAK-E and the scientiﬁc college of gen-
eral practitioners in Denmark (Dansk Selskab for
Almen Medicin, DSAM), the infrastructure expanded
and DAMD also came to support the implementation
of clinical guidelines. While this hardly challenged the
purpose of enhancing the quality of clinical care, it
opened up a process of adding new purposes and stake-
holders to the infrastructure. Table 1 summarizes this
accumulation of purposes. The table is intended as a
simpliﬁed illustration of the multitude of purposes and
for some of the purposes, it is diﬃcult to say whether
they gave rise to actual data practices. In particular, it
seems that the purposes of audit, healthcare manage-
ment and national economic growth were merely
articulated as policy ambitions. Nevertheless, these
articulations had profound eﬀects among these GPs,
who disagreed with their legitimacy.
As data accumulated, researchers began to apply for
access to DAMD data. From about 2010, Erik
explained, enough data had been gathered for
DAMD to constitute ‘a gold mine of information for
research’ and over time about 80 projects made use of
anonymized data from DAMD. The regional authori-
ties who co-funded the activities also wanted to beneﬁt.
According to an administrative employee, who we will
call Morten, the regional authorities felt that ‘for quite
some years it had been limited what the Regions had
gained from [ﬁnancing the data collection]’ and that the
Regions ‘had to create some value’. In 2010, the regio-
nal authorities initiated negotiations with the Danish
GP organization about the collective agreement with
an extensive ‘wish list’, the employee explained, and
they succeeded in having most of their demands met.
Consequently, it became mandatory for GPs to install
Sentinel Datafangst, code patient contacts for eight
speciﬁed conditions, let data from the medical records
be copied to DAMD, and subsequently to clinical data-
bases administered by the regional authorities. This
allowed the authorities to pursue an ambition of
cross-sector quality monitoring by linking data from
general practice with data generated in the hospitals.
Moreover, the agreement required GPs to publish
data from the medical record on a web portal,
Sundhed.dk (Health.dk), where citizens can access
their own health data online with a log-in, and other
health professionals than the GP are allowed to view it
when relevant for a given treatment. In this way, a new
purpose of patient empowerment entered the infra-
structure along with enhanced opportunities of cross-
sector care. Whereas GPs had previously had the
option of letting only selected data be copied to
DAMD, Erik explained: ‘Now we had to send all the
data to Sundhed.dk. It was in the agreement’.
Therefore, a material reconﬁguration was made that
altered the data ﬂow profoundly: Sentinel Data Catch
was adapted so that all data except case notes were
automatically copied from the medical record to
DAMD. The transfer to Sundhed.dk also necessitated
a translation of diagnostic codes because codes used in
general practice were not fully compatible with the
codes used on Sundhed.dk. In consequence, some
patients were surprised to read diagnoses on the
online portal that they had never heard from their
Table 1. Accumulation of purposes with data use.
From Purposes






–Support for guideline implementation.
2010 Resource for research
–Epidemiological studies.
2010 Cross-sectorial quality monitoring (undertaken by
health authorities)
2010 Patient empowerment
–Access provided for patients to read structured
information from their own health records
through a public web portal.
2012 Management information for regional healthcare
authorities
–Resource for audit.
2012 Management and planning tool for health authorities
–Community level risk profiles
–Support for development of disease management
programmes
–Resource for early warning research.
2013 Motor of national economic growth
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doctor. Not all translations were equally successful and
even GPs were surprised by some of the algorithm-led
translations; for instance some codes for mental strain
were mistakenly translated into a diagnosis of pyro-
mania. The subsequent reactions illustrate the increas-
ing visibility of the new data ﬂows for GPs.
While oﬃcially serving the goal of patient empower-
ment, it was also acknowledged that enhanced trans-
parency for patients might enable a new form of
control. An employee who had been involved in the
set-up of the data extraction from DAMD to
Sundhed.dk noted that the project was given the work-
ing title ‘the snitch’ because it was envisioned that ‘citi-
zens would login and check whether doctors were
cheating and inform [the authorities], if the doctors
had billed services which patients hadn’t received’. In
an interesting move, the system that was designed to
allow individual doctors to identify the patients who
did not comply with treatment plans was now inverted
and seen as a tool that would allow patients to single
out the doctors who might not adhere to billing guide-
lines. This ambition of monitoring doctors rather than
patients was further expanded, when DAMD came to
be seen as a resource for external performance moni-
toring. A leader in a regional healthcare administration
explained: ‘you know, there are probably also some
mavericks in general practice and one could imagine
that there might be clinics that do a really poor job’.
Another leader elaborated:
In my view, it should be a perfectly legitimate request
from a customer – who pays a considerable sum to a
provider to complete a task on behalf of tax-payers and
patients – to want some insight into how the task is
solved and which outcomes it generates.
In the view of these oﬃcials, the demand for data is
legitimate because it is understood as a precondition
for qualiﬁed administration of public resources. While
they saw it as a legitimate purpose, they also stressed
that it required agreement regarding the conditions for
data use and collaboration between GP representatives
and the regional healthcare authorities. According to
Erik, however, he was contacted directly by a head of
division in a region and asked for performance infor-
mation on individual GPs:
Before the negotiations for the collective agreement
[between the regional authorities and the GPs’ organ-
ization] in 2013, [the head of division], called me during
my summer holidays and asked for data on which diag-
noses were given to the patients who had received con-
versation therapy. Because he wanted to see if [the fee
for] conversation therapy had been used for anything
else [than what had been agreed].
For some oﬃcials, DAMD data was becoming a tool of
accountability (cf. Winthereik et al., 2007). Other oﬃ-
cials emphasized the possibility of using DAMD data
for planning purposes, e.g., in the setting up of disease
management programmes, for revealing patterns of
demographic change and as early warning signs of epi-
demics. According to the informants we encountered,
these analyses were never performed, and DAMD data
was never forwarded to the regional authorities. DAK-E
rejected the requests because they found them to be out-
side the existing agreements. Nevertheless, it is clear that
once the set-up allowing for seamless data sourcing was
in place, it inspired new uses and invited other data
users, as has been the case across a range of sectors
using new digital tools to reinvent the purposes of data
accumulation (Madsen et al., 2016).
Along with the negotiations with regional authori-
ties, ‘state pressure’ for access to DAMD data was also
instituted, people working in DAK-E noted. They
explained how representatives from the State Serum
Institute (SSI) under the Ministry of Health came to
visit in 2013 and requested a copy of all DAMD
data. In 2012, SSI had been tasked with the collection
and dissemination of all national data on population
health, health service activity, economy and quality, in
an eﬀort to centralize the administration of health data.
Despite the pressure, DAK-E opposed this request. An
employee from DAK-E explained: ‘you know, the SSI
wanted to use it for government consultancy – and gov-
ernment consultancy . . . that is control’. At that time,
prominent themes in the political debates were reform
of payment models in the healthcare services inspired
by British models of pay-for-performance, but also the
idea that health data constituted an under-used
resource, which, if used in the right way, could poten-
tially stimulate economic growth (cf. Vezyridis and
Timmons, 2017). Hence, political ambitions were
voiced to turn Danish health data into a motor of
national economic growth, by providing private com-
panies with easier data access (Regeringen, 2013).
According to DAK-E, all these agendas ‘created pres-
sure’ and ‘made everybody nervous about how these
data would be used’, as one of the informants noted.
The informant’s notion of ‘everybody’ illustrates an
emerging sense of data anxiety.
To sum up, as new actors became part of the infra-
structural practices, DAMD data was put to new forms
of use. Initially a tool for quality improvement, it also
became articulated as a tool for research, patient
empowerment, healthcare planning, eﬃciency gains
and economic growth. These changes happened grad-
ually and without individual GPs necessarily noticing
the change. The seamless data experience was more or
less unaﬀected by the new uses and the infrastructure
remained largely invisible to the GPs and patients
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providing the data. However, the expansion of the
infrastructure involved a considerable potential for
conﬂict. GP-users did not experience friction in their
daily work, but this did not mean that the potential
for conﬂict disappeared. Rather, conﬂict arose as GPs
came to realize how much data was collected from the
medical records and how many purposes data might
serve. Whereas failure to enrol new actors in an infra-
structure is often seen as a cause of instability (e.g.,
Modol and Chekanov, 2014), the situation here appears
to be reversed: the sustainability was threatened by too
much integration (Langhoﬀ et al., 2016). This propos-
ition we develop in the following as we unfold the con-
troversy evolving around DAMD.
From seamless efficiency to fierce
contestation
An especially loud voice in what was to become a
heated debate about DAMD came from a small frac-
tion of GPs for whom the issue of data became a route
to political engagement. They self-identiﬁed as an infor-
mal group of what they themselves called the ‘data-
engaged GPs’ and coalesced around a network of
GPs named SPRAL. SPRAL refers to Selvstændige
PRAktiserende Læger which means Independent
General Practitioners. For one of the data-engaged
GPs who led the opposition against DAMD, the grad-
ual expansion of purposes was a key source of concern.
She explained: The idea was that DAMD would be ‘a
tool to provide the physician with a better overview for
the sake of improved patient treatment. But when other
interests suddenly crop up, it upsets the whole thing.
Somehow they don’t serve the purpose’. Previously, the
GP was a very active user of the tools that DAMD
provided:
For ten years, I have quietly looked after my business.
I’ve been a good doctor, coded everything and all that,
until I suddenly realized this . . . this invasion of the
professional authority or whatever you want to call it
[. . .]. This was crucial for my involvement.
Firstly, it is important to note her experience of surprise
when she suddenly realized that she provided data for
many more purposes than what she thought she had
signed up to do. It signals a new visibility of the infra-
structure for the GP. This feeling of being surprised
stayed with her: she likened it to a wide open backdoor
to the consultation room, in which she had previously
believed that conﬁdential conversations took place. The
developers of DAMD and the interviewed healthcare
oﬃcials could not understand this perception. They
emphasized that the GPs had agreed to have a techni-
cian come and install the software and had even
received a fee for it from the regional authorities.
Therefore, they should have known. Nevertheless,
while the GPs were aware that they were providing
some data for the purpose of quality development,
the expansion of the infrastructure and the exact
travel routes of data had remained invisible to them.
When and how did the infrastructure then become
visible to the GPs? When referring to an ‘invasion’ of
her professional authority, the data-engaged GP
referred to a particular political process: a process
that started with the negotiation of the collective agree-
ment for GPs in 2013 and developed into conﬂict, ter-
mination of the agreement and intervention by the
national government. In this process, ‘data meant a
lot’, a former director of DAK-E noted, explaining
that the requirement of individual level performance
data ‘led to ﬁerce resistance among the physicians’.
Whereas the regional authorities saw their requirement
of data as a legitimate way to ensure eﬃcient spending
of public resources, a sizeable group of the GPs saw it
as an unacceptable violation of their professional
autonomy and patient privacy. Moreover, in line with
the explanation of the DAK-E employees, the data-
engaged GP expressed fears that expanded data
access by health authorities would pave the way for
data sale. It is unclear whether any concrete plans
of data sale existed and whether they included
DAMD data. However, the mere possibility of com-
mercialization appears to have generated resistance.
Following this value conﬂict, the data-engaged GPs
started scrutinizing the ﬂow of data from their com-
puter systems in an eﬀort to make themselves able to
see the digital infrastructure they were part of. One of
them recalled: ‘We found out that they not only had
access to the projects we’d signed up for [. . .] They had
access to the whole lot! This surprised us. This wasn’t
what we’d imagined at all’. With ‘they’, the GP was
referring to DAK-E. However, the GP soon realized
she was part of an infrastructure with even more diﬀuse
boundaries: she could not determine exactly who had
access to which pieces of information, in which form
and under which conditions. This experience of diﬀuse
boundaries echoes a more general concern expressed in
relation to the emerging data economy. As Pasquale
(2015) notes: ‘Tracked ever more closely by ﬁrms and
government, we have no clear idea of just how far much
of this information can travel, how it is used, or its
consequences’ (p. 3). Through conversations with IT
providers, freedom of information requests, close read-
ing of policy documents and other meticulous work, the
digital infrastructure started to become visible to the
data-engaged GPs.
Meanwhile, some of the GPs began having reactions
from patients who had been pressured by insurance
companies or municipal authorities to deliver printouts
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of their medical records directly from the web portal
Sundhed.dk, thereby sidestepping a doctor’s certiﬁcate.
Others saw how the availability of information at
Sundhed.dk could escalate conﬂict or even lead to vio-
lence in some families, because partners or parents
would share log-in information and have access to sen-
sitive health data, e.g., about abortion or sexually
transmitted diseases. It is unclear how widespread
these situations were. However, the data-engaged GPs
were dumbfounded by these scenarios. Akin to what
has been observed in a British context (Carter et al.,
2015), the data-engaged GPs publicly declared DAMD
and Sentinel Datafangst a serious threat to patients’
trust in GPs and a violation of privacy rights; broad-
casted among others in YouTube-videos. So, the infra-
structure that used to be seen as instrumental for good
patient care was now made visible by these GPs to a
broad public as a threat to patients.
Galvanized by what they discovered, the data-
engaged GPs also started to dig into the legal basis
for the data activities. As it turned out, this was
rather unclear. Like in the Swedish LifeGene case
described by Cool (2016), the infrastructure for data
exchange had expanded in ways that did not ﬁt the
existing legal categories. According to the data-engaged
GP introduced above, she and some of her colleagues
sought to voice their concerns over what they saw as
illegitimate and illegal data activity. However, they felt
that they were not being heard – not even by their rep-
resentatives in the GPs’ own organization: ‘No one
could hear us!’ the GP prompted. This fuelled an
already existing power struggle among the GPs.
Meanwhile, the national government had intervened
in the conﬂict between the regional authorities and
the GPs. Breaking with the tradition of consensus-
based regulation through collective agreements, legisla-
tive measures were prepared that forced the GPs to
report certain data to DAMD and made them subject
to ﬁnes if they did not. As a consequence, the data-
engaged GPs and others from the SPRAL network
declared themselves prepared to terminate their con-
tracts with the regional healthcare authorities and
become truly independent from the public healthcare
system. Moreover, two of the data-engaged GPs
turned against their own representatives as they
reported DAK-E and a regional government to the
police for illegal data activity. The day before the new
legislation was to enter into force, the same two GPs
made it a Facebook-event when they and about 70 col-
leagues de-installed the Data Catch software, which
allowed for automatic data extraction. Ironically, we
may note, the use of Facebook to mobilize resistance
meant that in order to defend privacy the GPs ended up
using a commercial platform known for its voracious
appetite for personal data. This seems to be the
situation in a data-intensive society, where nobody is
able to know every aspect of the data sourcing in which
they take part (Obar, 2015). The resistance of the GPs
soon caught the attention of journalists. In the subse-
quent broadcasting of the case in national news media,
the data extraction was repeatedly presented as illegal.
In the course of the visibility created by the ensuing
public debate, the focus of the parliamentary discussion
began revolving around the legality of the data collec-
tion per se, and citizens started to demand that their
data be deleted: about 20,000 citizens asked to opt out.
In the autumn of 2014, a consensus seems to be reached
among the national and regional healthcare authorities
that the data extraction probably was illegal and the
data sourcing was suspended. It took another three
years before the GPs and the Regions reached an agree-
ment that opened up for the sourcing of selected types
of data for selected purposes starting in the autumn of
2017 (RLTN, 2017).
Discussion and conclusion
For years, the challenge in digitalization of healthcare
has been one of creating a ‘digital ﬁt’ between users and
technologies: a smooth and seamless work experience
with a minimum of friction. In this paper, we have
traced the rise and fall of a technology that had
achieved just this goal. A group of dedicated GPs had
created a promising infrastructure for data exchange; it
provided easy and eﬃcient data traﬃc and it was
acknowledged for being helpful in the daily practice
of GPs. The eﬀorts of the developers to obtain seamless
work experiences facilitated expansion of the infra-
structure to encompass still more purposes; an expan-
sion that remained largely invisible to the practicing
GPs because it did not require additional work (cf.
Berg and Goorman, 1999). Data multiplied, as copies
were made and distributed to new actors and for new
purposes. Hence, the seamlessness ﬁrst created invisibil-
ity for those who produced the data (cf. Star and
Ruhleder, 1996), which in turn created a ‘spectacle’
that overshadowed the practical evaluation of what
the technology could and should do (cf. Larkin,
2013). Eventually, it caused the collapse of the
DAMD infrastructure.
The added purposes reﬂected competing political
projects. While ﬁrst serving as a tool for doctors to
monitor their patients, the political vectors gradually
turned, and the data sourcing software grew into a
potential tool for patients and authorities to monitor
their doctors. STS scholars have already observed how
digitalization of the medical record involved a trans-
formation of the record itself from a clinical tool in
the hands of the GP to an audit tool in the hands of
authorities (e.g., Winthereik et al., 2007); simply
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because data are available in an exchangeable format,
the payers of the services can also demand data access.
Our point is to consider how this transformation can
lead to social conﬂict and in particular how the other-
wise praised virtue of seamlessness plays a role in this
process. Seamlessness made the expansion of data uses
invisible, but did not erase the conﬂicting interests and
political values. Seamlessness, in this way, has political
implications but oﬀers no political tools for handling
potential conﬂicts.
As already mentioned, the Danish case is not unique.
In England, care.data was met with opposition, when it
became known that the database enabled reuse of data
from electronic medical records from general practice
for research and other purposes, including the aim of
stimulating national economic growth (Carter et al.,
2015). Also here, it was not a question of technical
problems bringing data sourcing to a halt, but an
inability to ensure political legitimacy (Vezyridis and
Timmons, 2017). Garrety et al. (2014) have pointed
out a tendency among decision-makers to focus on
the technical capabilities of new IT systems, while over-
looking the moral complexities of digitalized data sour-
cing. In an American context, investigative journalist
Tanner (2017) calls attention to the invisible, seamless
and ubiquitous data sourcing from pharmacies, labora-
tories and clinics, which bolsters commercial markets
for health data, without providing the data sources –
the patients – with any tools of control. These examples
demonstrate how a seamless data exchange might have
been a solution to the old problem of a poor ﬁt between
user and technology; but new dangers lurk in its after-
math, if we do not develop tools to negotiate the legit-
imacy of the emerging data infrastructures.
While we have pointed out cases of conﬂict, it is
equally important to note that not all eﬀorts to build
up health-data infrastructures are troubled in this way
(McCartney, 2014; Sethi and Laurie, 2013; Vezyridis
and Timmons, 2016). For example, the Scottish
Health Informatics Programme (SHIP) involved work
to develop a new governance model, where ‘early and
sustained stakeholder engagement was invaluable to
identifying the key and diverse ethical, legal, social
and practical issues implicated in delivering a more
streamlined system’ (Sethi and Laurie, 2013: 180).
This is not to say that the Scottish governance model
will never encounter resistance or necessarily work else-
where, but we think it points to a need for the develop-
ment of political mechanisms suited for the local
context, to ensure the social sustainability of data infra-
structures. Discussion of the politics of social sustain-
ability must also take into account knowledge about
data validity. It is well-known that validity is aﬀected
by data reuse (Markus, 2001), and that healthcare pro-
fessionals tend to report data strategically when they
are aware that data are being used for control purposes
(Martin et al., 2013; Smith, 1995). To work in an edu-
cated way with political mechanisms must therefore
also involve engagement with studies of the social
mechanisms of data reuse and not be limited to legal
contemplation of patient rights.
The paradox of seamlessness as a source of social
instability has even greater relevance when we look
beyond healthcare to the global data markets created
by the big US high-tech companies, Microsoft, Google,
Facebook, Apple and Amazon, as well as their Chinese
counterparts Baidu, Alibaba and Tencent (Creemers,
2016). They thrive on seamless technology experiences.
While providing for easy use, however, seamlessness
also creates a blurred sense of control. As Obar
(2015) notes, people are left with an obscure and insur-
mountable task, should they be held responsible for
monitoring all data sourcing in which they engage in
a digitalized society. When the ‘digital ﬁt’ is ﬁnally
achieved, new dangers lure in the shadows of the eﬀort-
less interface. The problems of sustainability, that we
forefront here, are of course not the only dangers that
needs to be confronted considering the challenges to
democracy, the role of media, national security and
public trust that digitalized data accumulation also
entail (e.g., O’Neil, 2016; Pasquale, 2015). However,
we ﬁnd the discussion of social sustainability a fruitful
place to start as it raises questions of which mechanisms
that may be needed to ensure that users are able to see
the political work that is also being done by expanding
digital infrastructures.
If seamlessness is not just an ideal of technical oper-
ationability, but also a source of social instability, an
important task for STS lies in supporting the establish-
ment of new forums for the negotiation of conﬂicting
values related to data sourcing. In eﬀorts to enable data
exchange, friction can be seen as the antithesis of seam-
lessness. Edwards (2010) speaks of ‘data friction’ as ‘the
cost in time, energy, and attention required simply to
collect, check, store, move, receive, and access data’ (p.
84). Friction creates a form of awareness of all the work
going into data sourcing (cf. Berg and Goorman, 1999),
but we are now at a stage where it takes other means to
create this awareness. It is hardly a solution to reintro-
duce data friction and make the course of everyday
work more diﬃcult, just to raise awareness of data
uses. Rather, we suggest that there is a new need to
focus attention beyond the digital ﬁt to political mech-
anisms for negotiation of values and interests to ensure
the long-term sustainability of digital infrastructures.
Along with the already massive investments in new
technologies, we need to allocate resources to the devel-
opment of political mechanisms to deﬁne and protect
the rights and obligations of both data suppliers and
users. We do not hold a solution, nor do we believe in a
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master plan, but we ﬁnd it necessary for new initiatives
to be introduced aimed at investigating what it takes for
digital infrastructures to be socially sustainable. First
and foremost, it must be acknowledged that reuse of
data comes at a cost, and that some purposes may con-
ﬂict and eventually undermine an infrastructure. There
are forms of reuse that are technically feasible but not
worthwhile, considering the implications they have for
primary purposes. Moreover, the easy click to agree to
terms of use provided by most social media platforms
does not perform well – it is part of the problem (Obar,
2015). Rather, a more socially sustainable digital devel-
opment will necessitate development of legal frame-
works at both national and international levels to
protect data sources against data use working against
their interests. This need for regulation has been
acknowledged at the EU level. In August 2017, EU
Commissioner of Competition Margrethe Vestager,
who has gained fame for battling the dominance of
the high-tech giants, called for a joint eﬀort among
international leaders to develop an International Data
Convention (Fejerskov, 2017). It will take years of dedi-
cated eﬀorts to establish such an international conven-
tion (and it will undoubtedly create new problems). In
the meantime there is work to be done in stipulating
national legal entitlements in relation to, for example,
transparency and limits to data uses (e.g., by limiting
the market in data proﬁles used in recruitment, credit
scoring, etc.), and in providing citizens with rights to
rectify erroneous data proﬁles. Other options could be
democratically elected or administratively appointed
data guardians who can be held responsible for think-
ing through when and whether data reuse negatively
aﬀects the primary purposes of data collection.
None of these suggestions will in and by themselves
create social sustainability, but we need to begin open-
ing new political spaces in which a multiplicity of new
tools may develop and conﬂicting values can be nego-
tiated. The dangers of the digital ﬁt involve a challenge
to democratic governance, and we need to ﬁnd ways to
address this challenge without ruining the pleasures of a
seamless user experience.
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